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ABSTRACT
During  the  recent  Financial  Crisis,  as  well  as  the  2010  and  ongoing  European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, several governments had/have had to raise their debt levels 
in order to stabilize their economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign 
debts,  which  is  linked  to  their  characteristics,  is  the  possibility  of  defaults 
occurring  in  relation  to  these  –  since  they  are  usually  accompanied  without 
collaterals. The possibilities of such defaults occurring are further increased where 
bailouts are granted in relation to these debts. Increased doubts in relation to the 
likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as 
the  consequential  occurrence   of  “very  high,  economically  penalizing,  interest 
rates”, is considered to be the present reality.
As well as a consideration of improvements which have been introduced through 
Basel III in respect of prudential supervisory tools (supervisory tools such as capital, 
liquidity  requirements,  and  macro  prudential  policy  tools),  and  an  analysis  of 
recent efforts  which have been undertaken by the Basel  Committee to address 
information gaps in derivative markets (a source of huge losses to many major 
banks), the paper also explores how the new Basel liquidity standards (that is, the 
Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), could be 
effectively implemented in mitigating sovereign debt crises. Ultimately, the paper 
will seek to demonstrate that additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced 
by the Basel Committee, will play a very crucial role if the new liquidity standards 
are to achieve their desired effects and stated objectives.
Key  Words:  European  Sovereign  Debt  Crisis;  Basel  III;  Dodd Frank  Act;  Capital 
standards;  Liquidity  Standards;  macro  prudential  policy  tools;  Over-the-Counter 
(OTC)  derivatives;  Credit-Default-Swaps  (CDS);  markets;  disclosure;  bank; 
regulation; leverage ratios
Capital, Liquidity Standards and Macro Prudential Policy Tools in Financial 
Supervision: Addressing Sovereign Debt Problems
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A. Introduction
Even though it is argued that the most recent Financial Crisis was a capital crisis - 
not  a  liquidity  crisis,  events  such  as  the  failure  of  Northern  Rock,  as  well  as 
problems  encountered  by  major  banks  which  were  considered  to  have  been 
complying with Basel Capital requirements, are plausible indicators of the fact that 
the recent Financial Crisis was triggered by pro cyclical, as well as liquidity related 
issues  such  as  maturity  transformations.  The  focus  accorded  by  the  Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision to capital requirements - as opposed to liquidity 
standards,  also provided further justification for  evidence which corroborates  a 
lack of sufficient focus on matters  and factors  which contribute in  triggering a 
liquidity, and ultimately, banking crises.
Whilst it is widely agreed and not disputed that capital and liquidity requirements 
both contributed to the most recent Financial Crisis, the extent to which Basel III 
addresses  major/fundamental  questions  arising from the Crisis,  provides further 
grounds for further debates. This paper considers those fundamental issues which 
have arisen in light of the recent Crisis against the background of efforts which 
have been made by the Basel Committee to consolidate capital, liquidity standards 
– as well as macro prudential policy tools. As well as highlighting the increased 
focus accorded by the Basel Committee to the macro prudential level, the paper 
will  consider  macro  prudential  policies  which  have been introduced to address 
system wide risks.
The first four sections of this paper (subsequent to the introductory section) will 
consider improvements which have been introduced through Basel III in respect of 
prudential  supervisory  tools.  To facilitate this  aim, these  sections  will  consider 
capital, liquidity and macro prudential supervisory tools which currently exist or 
are about to be introduced. In emphasizing the need for greater focus on macro 
prudential policies – which ultimately facilitate a more system-wide market based 
approach to regulation, sections two to five illustrate how Basel III’s more macro 
prudential  focus  should  help  facilitate  the  monitoring  of  vital  and  useful 
information such as market wide data on asset prices and liquidity. The need for 
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such monitoring being of vital importance since derivative markets, (and the Over-
the-Counter (O-T-C) derivatives market in particular – being the largest2 market for 
derivatives), are largely unregulated with respect to the disclosure of information 
between parties. 
Hence the sixth section of the paper will consider the importance of information 
gaps  –  particularly  within  OTC  markets,  as  well  as  steps  taken  by  the  Basel 
Committee  to  address  these.  The second  half  of  this  paper  (commencing  with 
section six) seeks to address two important aspects, namely:
i) The need to  introduce  measures  which  are  aimed at  facilitating  greater 
disclosure in respect of complex instruments which banks are exposed to 
during  the  course  of  their  daily  transactions.  One  of  such  complex 
instruments being the OTC derivatives markets – whereby many major banks 
are exposed to huge losses.
A second means whereby many major banks could be exposed to huge losses is 
attributed to sovereign debt exposures.  “Many European banks are thought to have 
large holdings  of sovereign debt from the “peripheral” countries  that  have not 
been marked-to-market, and thus represent sizeable potential losses for the banks 
when the sovereign debt is ultimately restructured.” 3
Sovereign debt exposures, the effects of bail outs resulting from sovereign debts, 
ways whereby the new Basel liquidity standards could help address sovereign debt 
2
2
 The “OTC derivative market is the largest market for derivatives. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements, the total outstanding notional  amount is US $684 trillion (as of June 
2008). Of this notional amount, 67% comprise interest rate contracts; 8% credit default swaps (CDS); 
9%  foreign  exchange  contracts;  2%  commodity  contracts;  1%  equity  contracts;  and  12%  other. 
Because OTC derivatives are not traded on an exchange, there is no central counter party and they 
are therefore subject to counter party risk – like an ordinary contract (since each counterparty 
relies on the other to perform).” See Financial Stability Board, 
“Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms” 25th October 2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf>  and also 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derivative_(finance)#OTC_and_exchange_traded>
3
3
 “The ECB and the European central banks”, it is further argued, “need to identify those 
banks  that  are  impaired  by  excessive  sovereign  holdings  and  assist  them in  recapitalization  – 
however, also pushing the larger, stronger banks to accept exchange offers in the interest of bank 
transparency  and  restructuring  as  well  as  in  resolving  the  sovereign  debt  problem.”  See  N 
Economides and RC Smith, “Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem” January 
2011  at pages 2 and 3 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
problems (as well as other measures which have been proposed), will constitute 
the focus of discussion in relation to the remaining sections of this paper.
ii) The sovereign debt problem leads us to the second important aspect, the 
importance of  timely  implementation  of  additional  leverage ratios  which 
have recently  been  introduced by  the  Basel  Committee.  If  the  two  new 
liquidity standards, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), and the Net Stable 
Funding  Ratio  (NSFR),  are  introduced  without  coupling  these  to  the 
additional new leverage ratios, this could lead to a concentration of banks’ 
funds – which could subsequently be vulnerable to sovereign exposures.
Basel III is considered to be “fundamentally different” from Basel I and II as a result 
of  its  combination  of  “micro  and  macro  prudential  reforms  to  address  both 
institution and system level risks.”4
Basel III = Enhanced Basel II + Macro prudential Outlay5
Enhanced Basel II = Micro prudential Framework (aimed at “increasing quantity as 
well  as  improving  quality  of  capital,  adequate  capital  charges  needed  in  the 
trading book, enhancing risk management and disclosure, introducing a leverage 
ratio to supplement risk weighted measures, addressing counter party risk posed by 
Over-the Counter (OTC) derivatives.”)
Macro Prudential Outlay:
This aspect addresses:
i)  ”stability over time” (pro cyclicality) through:
4
4
 With respect to micro prudential aspects, Basel III reforms indicate i) “Significant increase 
in risk coverage – with focus on areas that were most problematic during the Crisis (for example, 
trading  book  exposures,  counterparty  credit  risk,  and securitization  activities);  ii)  fundamental 
tightening of the definition of capital – as well as a strong focus on common equity (introduction of 
requirements that all capital instruments must absorb losses at the point of non-viability – which 
was not the case during the most recent Financial Crisis); iii) Introduction of  a leverage ratio which 
should serve as a backstop to the risk based framework; iv) the introduction of global liquidity 
standards to address short-term and long term liquidity mismatches; and v) Enhancements to Pillar 
2’s  supervisory  review  process  and  Pillar  3’s  market  discipline  –  particularly  for  trading  and 
securitization activities.” S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System” 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 3 of 12
5
5
 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” Bank for International 
Settlements Publications page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
- Counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers
ii) As well as “stability at each point in time” (system wide approach):
- Systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions
- Identify inter linkages and common exposures among all financial institutions
- Systemic oversight of OTC derivatives (CCP infrastructure)
Weaknesses in Basel rules will be considered from the perspective attributed by 
such rules to capital and liquidity requirements. 
B. Capital Requirements
As highlighted in several papers,6 Basel II’s internal credit risk models7 were not 
only considered to be:
6
6
 For example, see M Ojo, “Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress 
made by the Basel Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased 
Quality  of  Loss  Absorbing  Capital”  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680886 at  page  3  of  15.  “The 
introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to provide 
for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk. This was introduced into Basel II in view of the 
realization that the optimal balance may differ significantly across banks. The increased focus on 
risk (and particularly credit risk), resulted from growing realization of the importance of risk within 
the financial sector. The range of approaches to credit risk – as introduced under Basel II, and which 
also exists for market risk, consists of the Standardised approach (which is the simplest of the three 
broad approaches), the internal ratings based (IRB) foundational and advanced approaches.” See 
Basel  Committee on Banking Supervision,  “Consultative Document,  Standard Approach to Credit 
Risk,  Supporting  Document  to  the  New  Basel  Accord,  January  2001  at  page  1 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative 
Document,  The Internal  Ratings Based Approach Supporting Document to the New Basel  Capital 
Accord”  January  2001  Bank  for  International  Settlements  publications 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>
7
7
 Basel II’s internal credit risk models generated pro cyclical effects – given the fact that such 
models were overly sensitive in their implementation for the calculation of regulatory capital (their 
implementation  to  facilitate  “the  derivation  of  fundamental  inputs  for  formulas  which  will 
determine the level of capital which large banks must retain”).
- Unduly risk sensitive, but also tended to generate pro cyclical effects. This 
was illustrated during the Northern Rock Crisis.8 It has also been stated9 that 
Basel rules focused on one type of risk – the risk that a bank would make too 
many bad loans and lose so much money on those loans (such that its capital 
was wiped out). Whilst these observations reflect the magnitude of attention 
dedicated to capital requirements, it also highlights problems attributed to 
measurements in relation to such capital requirements. 
- They also generated pro cyclical effects. Pro cyclicality is  a fundamental 
issue arising from the implementation of Basel II capital requirements.
Another vital distinction between Basel II and Basel III is evident from the fact that 
under Basel III, systemically important banks will be required to have loss absorbing 
capacity  beyond the standards  approved and announced on the  12th September 
2010.10 Furthermore, the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
are  “developing  a  well  integrated  approach  to  systemically  important  financial 
institutions which could include a combination of capital surcharges, contingent 
capital and bail in debt.”11
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is considered to be:
8
8
 “One of the underlying features of the recent Crisis was the build-up of excessive on and 
off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage 
while still showing strong risk based capital ratios. During the most severe part of the Crisis, the 
banking  sector  was  forced  by  the  market  to  reduce  its  leverage  in  a  manner  that  amplified 
downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between losses, 
declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability.” See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision,  “Basel  III:  A Global  Regulatory  Framework  For  More  Resilient  Banks  and  Banking 
Systems” December 2010 at page 68 – 69 of 77 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
9
9
 T Congdon, “Northern Rock Shows Up Mess of Basel Rules”  January 2008 < 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2783500/Northern-Rock-shows-up-mess-of-Basel-
rules.html> (last visited 18 May 2011)
10
1
 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Groups of Governors and Heads of 
Supervision Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12 September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
<http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1>
11
 ibid
[Tier One Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical Capital 
Buffer] + [Capital for Systemically Important Banks]12
C. Liquidity Requirements
In  highlighting  why  the  relatively  low focus  attached  to  liquidity  requirements 
constituted another element of those weaknesses attributed to Basel  rules, the 
importance  of  liquidity  and  the  role  of  banks  in  maturity  transformations 
(ultimately triggering banking crises), has been demonstrated in several respects.13 
The Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) which imposes a requirement that banks maintain 
an  adequate  level  of  “unencumbered,  high-quality  liquid  assets  that  can  be 
converted to cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon 
under  severe  liquidity  stress  conditions  specified  by  supervisors”14 and  the  Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard which is designed to “promote longer-term 
funding  of  the  assets  and  activities  of  banking  organizations  by  establishing  a 
minimum  acceptable  amount  of  stable  funding  based  on  the  liquidity  of  an 
institution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon”,15 it is argued, should 
facilitate a diversification of liquid assets – hence discouraging a situation where 
they could be accumulated and susceptible to exposures such as those relating to 
sovereign  debts.  It  will  however,  be  highlighted  in  subsequent  sections  of  the 
12
1
 For further information on capital conservation buffer and counter cyclical capital buffer, 
see section D, “Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements”. See also Basel III 
Compliance  Professionals  Association  (BiiiCPA),  “The  Basel  III  Accord:  Capital  for  Systemically 
Important Banks Only” < http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>
13
 For example, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity 
Risk  Management  and  Supervision”  September  2008  at  page  1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>;  As  well  as  (banks)  being  regarded as  highly  leveraged 
institutions  which  are  considered  to  be  “at  the  centre  of  the  credit  intermediation  process”, 
functions related to credit and maturity transformation are considered to be “vulnerable to liquidity 
runs and loss of confidence.” See also S Walter, “Basel III:  Stronger Banks and a More Resilient 
Financial System” http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 1 of 12
14
 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” December 2009 at page 3 (11 
of 44) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>
15
 ibid
paper, that the two new Basel liquidity standards, will probably not achieve their 
desired objectives where such standards are not coupled with leverage ratios.
D. Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The incorporation  of  macro prudential  elements  into Basel  III  –  in  the form of 
capital buffers, the new liquidity standards, and leverage ratios, can be regarded 
as efforts aimed at addressing capital and liquidity requirements.
Capital Buffers: Such buffers are intended solely (as well as not exclusively) to 
address problems attributed to pro cyclicality. They consist of:
- Counter cyclical capital buffers16
- Capital conservation buffers
Counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers constitute macro 
prudential  tools in the “time dimension”17 –  such tools focusing on the need to 
mitigate pro-cyclical effects.
Whilst  counter  cyclical  capital  buffers  and  capital  conservation  buffers  are 
synonymous with capital requirements, equivalent “buffers” which serve to address 
liquidity imbalances comprise the two new liquidity standards, the Liquid Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Further, these new liquidity 
standards and the additional minimum leverage ratio, it is argued, “could limit the 
build-up of financial imbalances during the expansion phase of the financial cycle. 
In particular, the additional leverage ratio provides an important back stop in cases 
where excessive optimistic point-in-time risk measures tend to shrink risk weighted 
assets and required cushions.”18
16
1
 With counter cyclical capital buffers, “the build-up of the buffer is encouraged through 
restrictions on capital distributions. Authorities would then release the buffer based on signs of 
strains, such as aggregate losses or tighter credit terms. In both cases, the exercise of discretion 
still  applies.”  See  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  “Macro  prudential  Policy  Tools  and 
Frameworks:  Update  to  G20  Finance  Ministers  and  Central  Bank  Governors.”  at  page  5 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
17
The first of two dimensions on which macro prudential policies aim to address system wide 
risk. The second dimension is referred to as “the cross sectional dimension”. The “time-dimension” 
is defined as “the evolution of system-wide risk over time” whilst the “cross sectional dimension” is 
defined as “the distribution of risk in the financial system – at a given point in time”. See ibid at 
page 2
18
 Ibid at page 6
Leverage Ratios: The minimum leverage ratio and the new liquidity standards are 
considered19 to have the potential  to limit  the build-up of  financial  imbalances 
during the expansion phase of the financial cycle. Leverage ratios such as debt 
ratios (ratio of debt to assets); debt-equity ratios, usually provide good indication 
of an entity’s means of financing. Such ratios reflect whether such an entity is able 
to meet its obligations as it falls due. Hence they also reflect how “liquid” a firm 
is.  If  the  quality  of  debts  issued  by  an  entity  is  poor,  then  the  possibility  of 
redeeming such may result in a situation where the company is left in a vulnerable 
position (owing to level of losses incurred) – since it finds it difficult to meet its 
obligations as they fall due. The impact of short term borrowing on maturity and 
liquidity has been considered in various literature on the topic.20
Deleveraging  is  a  process  whereby  an  undertaking  or  financial  intermediary 
attempts  to  reduce  its  balance  sheet,  for  example,  by  disposing  of  its  assets. 
Recent Basel III reforms will play a huge role in the level of deleveraging (by banks) 
-  which  is  presently  occurring  (and  which  is  expected  to  take  place  in  the 
subsequent months).  
E. Macro prudential policies
A macro prudential policy is one which “uses primarily prudential tools to limit 
systemic  or  system  wide  financial  risk  –  thereby  limiting  the  incidence  of 
disruptions  in  the  provision  of  key  financial  services  that  can  have  serious 
consequences for the real economy by:
- Dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building defences which 
contain the speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their effects 
on the economy;
19
1
 See S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System” 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 6 of 12
20
2
 “Deleveraging also puts additional downward pressure on financial markets.” Furthermore, 
consequences of short term borrowing include “serious liquidity problems especially in the case of 
financial distress: the funding of long term investments through short term debt widens maturity 
and  liquidity  gaps,  making  banks  more  vulnerable  to  runs.”  See  N  Papanikolaou  and  C  Wolff, 
“Leverage and Risk in US Commercial Banking in the Light of the Recent Financial Crisis.” March 
2011 Draft
- Identifying and addressing common exposures, risk concentrations, linkages 
and interdependencies that are sources of contagion and spill over risks that 
may jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole.”21
Pro cyclicality (as well as its impact), is usually attributed to the aggregational 
build-up  of  system  wide  risks  over  time.  Policies  which  exacerbate  cyclical 
tendencies (for example Basel II’s capital requirements)/cyclical effects which are 
exacerbated during peaks and booms and which usually demonstrate the impact of 
aggregational effects of cyclical phases, are referred to as being pro cyclical.22
F. Information gaps in Over-the Counter (OTC) derivative markets – ongoing 
efforts by the Basel Committee to address these
In view of the inter dependencies between systemic, liquidity risks, moral hazard, 
transparency,  information  asymmetries  and  disclosure,  ongoing  efforts  by  the 
Committee  to  address  information  gaps  in  OTC  derivative  markets  cannot  be 
regarded as surprising. Efforts being undertaken by the Basel Committee, as well as 
other bodies such as the Financial Stability Board, in focusing on a more system-
wide based regulatory process involve the implementation of “time dimension” and 
“cross sectional dimension” macro prudential policies, as well as plans aimed at 
facilitating  these  policies.  Such  a  macro  prudential  approach  will  consequently 
result in greater extension of regulation to the securities markets. Further, it will 
help facilitate the monitoring of vital and useful information such as market wide 
asset  prices  and liquidity.  Substantial  work  is  currently  taking place to address 
important data gaps:23
21
2
 See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: 
Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 2  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
22
 „Leverage ratios serve a macro prudential response – in respect of the cyclical movement 
of leverage at the system wide level. Leverage which tends to build up prior to crisis periods, is 
subsequently  unwound when a crisis  occurs.  This  cyclical  aspect  exacerbates  both the  upswing 
phase  and  the  downturn.  In  addition,  what  could  appear  to  be  very  low  risk  assets  at  the 
institutional level, can ultimately create incentives for the build-up of risks at the broader system 
level.”
23
  See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: 
Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 3  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
Within the overall programme, priorities involve the provision of information 
on aspects where the absence of good information has proved costly, and in 
particular:
- i)  The  inter  linkages  between  large,  globally  systemically  important 
institutions
- ii) Emerging concentrations of risk in terms of both exposures and funding 
dependencies to certain institutions, countries and financial sectors;
- iii) The transfer and ultimate holding of risk
- iv) System wide leverage and maturity mismatches
G. Sovereign Debts and Moral Hazard Attributed to Sovereign Debt Bailouts
During  the  recent  Financial  Crisis  (as  well  as  the  2010  and  ongoing  European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis), several governments have had to raise their debt levels in 
order to stabilize their economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign 
debts,  which  is  linked  to  their  characteristics,24 is  the  possibility  of  defaults 
occurring.  Increased  doubts  in  relation  to  the  likelihood  of  larger  sovereigns 
“rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the consequential occurrence 
of “very high, economically penalizing, interest  rates”, is  considered to be the 
present reality.25 
Another problem involves bailouts related to sovereign debts: Whilst bailouts are 
deemed essential in facilitating financial stability, moral hazard, increased costs 
(particularly with regards to high interest rates), attributed to such bailouts need 
to be addressed. Where bailouts are eventually granted, distressed countries in 
need of such bailouts should be assisted in completing the repayments relating to 
24
2
 Sovereign debts differ from private debts in view of the fact that:
- Collateral is rarely ever provided;
- No direct means exist to ensure the enforcement of the repayment of sovereign 
debts
- No specified procedures exist in respect of a sovereign debtor who is unwilling to 
pay. See S Brandauer, “Sovereign Debt and Economic Policies in Global Markets: A Political 
Economy  Approach”  (2006)  –  particularly  chapter  on  “Domestic  Debt  as  a  Commitment 
Device –  A Probabilistic Voting Model of Sovereign Debt” at page 20  http://edoc.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/5082/1/Brandauer_Stefan.pdf (last visited 19 May 2011) 
25
 See N Economides and RC Smith, „Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign Debt 
Problem“ January 2011 NET Institute at page 7  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836743 
such  bailouts  (through  the  extension  of  repayment  periods  or  reduced interest 
rates)  –  rather  than  aggravating  their  position  (hence  facilitating  the  risk  of 
defaults).
Whilst bailouts, in certain instances, are necessary in order to facilitate financial 
stability,  such  bailouts  should  occur  as  a  means  of  last  resort  –  after  other 
initiatives and remedies have been applied and sought. 
On March 12 2011, EU officials announced the following remedies – as a means of 
sustaining European sovereign debt markets:26
- Doubling the lending capacity  of  the European Financial  Stability  Facility 
(EFSF)27 from 220 billion Euros to 440 billion Euros
- Purchasing the sovereign debt of primary markets, as needed
- Extending the repayment period for and lower than the interest rate charged 
on Greece’s rescue loans.
It is not surprising that yields on the ten year Spanish, Greek and Portuguese bonds 
soared to new records, following the announcement. Such reaction serves only to 
justify the assertion that bailouts should not always be granted liberally without 
having consulted other measures. Sovereign debts, as highlighted earlier on in the 
abstract (and this section of the paper), given their nature, are more susceptible to 
defaults  than  other  forms  of  private  debts.  The  possibilities  of  such  defaults 
occurring are further increased where bailouts  are granted in relation to these 
debts.
According to Economides and Smith, the European authorities’ solution relating to 
the ECB’s  purchase of  outstanding sovereign debt in  the market (as  of January 
2011) had only succeeded in buying a small amount of the distressed debt whilst 
26
2
 See N Isaac, „EU Bailouts Fail to Keep European Sovereign Debt Markets Afloat“ April 2011 
<http://www.elliottwave.com>
27
On the 9th May 2010,  Europe’s Finance Ministers approved the creation of  the European 
Financial Stability
 Facility – which is aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe (through the provision of 
financial assistance to Euro zone states during periods of economic difficulty). The objective of 
the EFSF being the collection of funds and the provision of loans in conjunction with the IMF to 
address the financing needs of Euro area member states in difficulty. Euro area member states 
are to provide guarantees for EFSF issuance of up to a total of 440 billion euro on a pro rata 
basis. See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis 
of  the  Euro  zone  Sovereign  Debt  Crisis>  at  page  1  of  41 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776425>
pushing bond prices upwards as a result of such intervention. They propose the 
creation of so called “Trichet Bonds” which are intended to be ”new long duration 
bonds issued by countries in the EU area that are to be collateralized by zero-
coupon bonds of the same duration issued by the ECB”.28 Advantages attributed to 
such “Trichet Bonds” are as follows:29
- Trichet  Bonds  Eliminate  Uncertainties  in  respect  of  the  Refinancing 
Distressed Countries’ Maturing Debt
- Trichet Bonds will be of much higher quality than present sovereign debt of 
distressed countries
- Trichet bonds will be liquid
- Trichet bonds will require no bailouts and imply no moral hazard
- Trichet Bonds provide debt relief for distressed economies
- The exchange is voluntary and beneficial to both countries and debt holders
Such  Trichet  bonds,  indeed,  would  have  provided  a  better  alternative  to  the 
remedies announced by EU officials on March 12, 2011. Had such Trichet bonds 
been considered as an initial resort, and given the existence of appropriate and 
adequate incentives for countries issuing such bonds, as well as debt holders to 
participate  in  the  exchange  process,  they  could  have  served  as  better  initial 
options than the subsequent European bailouts.
Any possibilities or likelihood of successfully implementing such Trichet bonds at 
present, should be considered doubtful since no incentives would appear to exist – 
with respect to distressed EU countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, 
in issuing such bonds. This is attributed to the fact that such countries having had a 
“better offer” in agreeing to the March 12 2011 remedies, are likely to be more 
reluctant to purchase “zero coupon collateral bonds” directly from the (European 
Central  Bank)  ECB.  Apart  from  addressing  whether  such  countries  are  able  to 
“apply some of (or any of)  their  reserves held by the ECB for  this  purpose, or 
otherwise enter into an appropriate financing package with the ECB,”30 there would 
28
2
 See N Economides and R C Smith, „Trichet Bonds to Resolve the European Sovereign Debt 
Problem“ at page 2  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
29
 Ibid at pages 5 and 6
30
3
 See ibid at page 5
appear to be less incentives for such countries to issue these Trichet bonds since 
they have relatively long term obligations ( ten year bonds) at present. For these 
reasons, such possibilities of having provided a collateral with exchanged sovereign 
bonds (via the issue of Trichet bonds by distressed European countries), have been 
significantly reduced. There is now increased likelihood (with increased national 
deficits of certain distressed countries) that defaults will occur.
II. Should sovereign debts be encouraged?
Increased costs31 of sovereign debts will not only discourage investors in purchasing 
such debts (hence promoting a situation where higher yields occur) but would also 
increase possibilities where some bond holders (investors) may have to share costs 
attributed to future bailouts – with possibilities that taxpayers could even become 
involved in the cost sharing process.
Sovereign debts should be encouraged: i) where such debts are required for the 
stabilization of economies and;  ii)  where some form of collateral  accompanies 
such debts.
H. Role of New Basel Liquidity Standards in Mitigating Sovereign Debt Crises 
It  is  argued  that  the  new  liquidity  standards  should  help  facilitate  greater 
diversification of the pool of liquid assets held by banks – contrary to the argument 
presented by those who are of the opinion that the new liquidity standards will 
facilitate a situation where a concentration of government debts are encouraged.32 
According to the Basel Committee’s most recent impact study, “bank holdings of 
liquid assets – which continue to be dominated by exposures to sovereigns, central 
banks and zero percent risk weighted public sector entities, comprise 85% of banks’ 
31
3
- Booming deficits and the need to finance banking bailouts worth billions have turned 
sovereign bonds into
the new “junk debt market”. Investors are now paying $88,000 to insure $I million worth of 
debt issued by a group of sovereign countries – or 88 basis points – more than the $83,000 paid 
to insure $1 million worth of corporate debt. The growing problems of the Greek economy 
during 2010 resulted in the cost of its protection against default rising to more than 400 basis 
points.”  See  E  Moya,  “Greece  and  the  Rising  Costs  of  Sovereign  Bonds”  29  January  2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/29/greece-debt-eu-sovereign-bonds> 
  
32
 See S Walter, „Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System“ 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 4 of 12
liquid assets.”33 Having considered both new liquidity standards,34 it could be said 
that the second standard, that is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard, is 
more likely to facilitate a situation where assets are concentrated and susceptible 
to sovereign exposures. In any case, the crucial issue relates to the need to address 
the liquidity needs of such banking entities – and consideration of the fact that 
such  standards  did  not  exist  previously  –  hence  contributing  to  the  fuelling  of 
systemic and liquidity risks which triggered the recent Financial Crisis.
Furthermore, the additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced35 by the 
Basel Committee, should help in facilitating the diversification of liquid assets. The 
two  new  standards,  on  their  own,  would  probably  not  be  able  to  effectively 
achieve the objective of diversification of liquid assets.
Leverage ratios  will  therefore  play  vital  roles  at  the  present  time (and in  the 
future) by:
- Helping to facilitate the diversification of assets – liquid assets in particular 
(and with respect to the new liquidity standards); and
- Helping to avoid the present consequential effects of Basel III – where banks, 
in an aim to achieve regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements, are 
compelled into a situation where aggressive de leverage occurs.
33
3
 ibid
34
 “The first objective of the two standards is to promote the short-term resiliency of the 
liquidity risk profile of institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high quality liquid resources 
to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. The Committee developed the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio to achieve this objective. The second objective is to promote resiliency over longer-
term time horizons by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more 
stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis.”
35
 “The Basel Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage 
ratio  that  is  calibrated  to  act  as  a  credible  supplementary  measure  to  the  risk  based  capital 
requirements. The leverage ratio is intended to achieve the objectives of constraining the build-up 
of  leverage in  the banking sector,  helping avoid destabilizing deleveraging  processes  which can 
damage the broader financial system and the economy; and reinforcing the risk based requirements 
with a simple non-risk based “back stop” measure.” See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
“Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” at pages 
68-69 of 77
I. How  Can  the  New  Basel  Liquidity  Standards  be  Implemented  More 
Optimally to Mitigate Sovereign Debt Crises: Importance of Information 
Channels
Market Liquidity and Sovereign Debts: Monitoring of Information Channels
“Manipulation of market liquidity is often the primary mechanism through which 
speculative attacks are channeled and in this case, the object of interest is the 
bilateral liquidity structure of the sovereign debt market and the sovereign CDS 
(Credit Default Swap) market.”36 The role and impact of the manipulation of the 
CDS market by speculative investors in exacerbating the liquidity dry up in the 
market for Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish sovereign debts, during the 2010 
Euro Crisis, raised concerns amongst several commentators.37
In this respect, greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II and the ever increasing need for 
greater  measures  aimed at  extending capital  rules  (as  well  as  other regulatory 
measures) to the securities markets, comes into play. If securities markets were not 
so  lightly  regulated  as  is  the  case  with  banks,  less  opportunities  would  be 
presented to investors who are able to manipulate38 CDS markets. Measures aimed 
at  facilitating  greater  enhanced  disclosures  continue  to  play  a  vital  role  in 
facilitating  market  discipline.  However,  in  order  to  reduce  incidences  of 
“manipulation” by speculative investors, greater discretion in respect of the timing 
and release of information to investors, will be required. Just as information plays 
a crucial role in fuelling bank runs, it also plays a vital role in manipulation within 
the CDS markets. Regulations which are able to address “short-term speculative 
short selling practices” in respect of sovereign debts will be required within the 
CDS markets. 
It has also been demonstrated that “whilst liquidity of the sovereign debt market 
dried up over the Crisis period of 2010, the liquidity of the CDS market increase 
36
3
 See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis 
of the Euro zone Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 5 of 41 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1776425>
37
 See ibid at page 2 of 41
38
 “In particular, “naked” CDS positions were blamed for driving bond yields on Greek, Irish, 
Spanish and Portuguese debt higher during the first half of 2010. Further, the manipulation of the 
CDS market by speculative investors was considered to have played a vital role in facilitating the dry 
up in the market for such countries’ sovereign debts. See ibid
dramatically with spread bids and spreads asked (offered) – approaching a one to 
one ratio.”
J. Conclusion
As highlighted in a previous paper, “the monitoring of useful data - such as market-
wide data on  asset  prices  and  liquidity,  institution  related  information  such  as 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices, additional institution-specific 
information  related  to  the  ability  of  the  institution  to  fund  itself  in  various 
wholesale funding markets, and the price at which it can do so, will be vital in 
obtaining a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity problems.”39
In relation to the “cross sectional dimensional aspect” of the Basel Committee’s 
macro prudential policies, several provisions in Basel III  should help to “address 
system  risk  and  interconnectedness  among  (global)  systemic  institutions,  by 
mitigating the risks arising from firm-level “cross dimensional” approach exposures. 
These include: higher capital  requirements for trading and derivative activities, 
complex  securitizations  and  off  balance  sheet  exposures,  capital  incentives  for 
banks to use central counter parties for OTC derivatives; liquidity requirements 
that better address funding risks related to excessive reliance on wholesale short 
term funding.”40
Until intended leverage ratios are introduced and coupled with the new liquidity 
standards [namely: the (Liquid Coverage Ratio) LCR and the Net stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR)]; these standards will probably not achieve half their desired effects – 
since liquid  assets  could  be accumulated under  these standards,  such as  to  an 
extent  where  they  are  susceptible  to  sovereign  exposures.  This  is  one  reason 
(amongst many)41, for concluding that whilst the Basel Committee has gone a long 
39
3
 See  M  Ojo,  „Preparing  for  Basel  IV  –  Why  Liquidity  Risks  Still  Present  a  Challenge  to 
Regulators in Prudential Supervision (II); and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel 
III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” at page 18 of 17 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
40
4
 Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update 
to  G20  Finance  Ministers  and  Central  Bank  Governors”  February  2011  at  page  7   < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
41
 Further challenges presented to Basel III include the restrictions imposed on it by the Dodd 
Frank Act – even though the Act is similar to Basel III in several respects (for example, in respect of 
its requirements of more stringent capital and liquidity standards, and a non risk leverage ratio).
way in  addressing  liquidity  risks,  its  efforts  still  remain  a  modest  milestone in 
combating liquidity risks in prudential supervision.
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